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PIRACY LAWS AND THE EFFECTIVE 
PROSECUTION OF PIRATES 
Diana Chang* 
Abstract: This Note analyzes the current international legal framework for 
the punishment and prosecution of maritime piracy. Piracy is an interna-
tional problem that disrupts global maritime trade and endangers the safe-
ty and security of crewmen and ship owners. Although it is a well-recog-
nized principle that each state has universal jurisdiction to prosecute pi-
rates, the conflicting international definitions of piracy and the preponder-
ance of attacks near states that lack resources to effectively prosecute pirates 
create a gap in enforcement within the international legal framework. This 
Note proposes that cooperating states should establish regional interna-
tional piracy tribunals that can apply an appropriate, uniform definition of 
piracy while providing the judicial resources to enforce international piracy 
laws. 
Introduction 
 Maritime piracy is a continuing international problem that dis-
rupts shipping lanes, the world economy, and the safety and security of 
crewmen and ship owners.1 In the first nine months of 2009, there were 
294 reported pirate attacks from all over the world.2 These attacks in-
cluded thirty-four successful hijackings and 559 hostages.3 The majority 
of these reported attacks occur in Southeast Asia, off the Horn of Af-
rica, and along the West Coast of Africa, with a few attacks scattered 
along the coast of South America.4 
 Within international law there is a well-recognized principle that 
each state has universal jurisdiction to prosecute pirates.5 Nevertheless, 
                                                                                                                      
* Diana Chang is a Staff Member for the Boston College International & Comparative Law 
Review. 
1 James Kraska & Brian Wilson, Fighting Piracy, Armed Forces J., Feb. 2009, at 10. 
2 ICC Com. Crime Servs., Int’l Mar. Bureau, Piracy Figures for 2009 Surpass Those for 
Previous Year, Sept. 23, 2009, http://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php?option=com_content&view= 
article&id=374. 
3 Id. 
4 ICC Com. Crime Servs., Int’l Mar. Bureau, IMB Live Piracy Map 2009, http:// 
www.icc-ccs.org (follow “View Live Piracy Map” hyperlink; then follow “Piracy Map 2009” 
hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 20, 2010). 
5 See David J. Bederman, International Law Framework 76 (2006). 
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the current legal framework creates a problem of “catch and release” 
because pirates are often released shortly after their capture due to lax 
domestic laws that do not adequately punish the offenders, or due to a 
state’s unwillingness to prosecute the offenders for various political rea-
sons.6 
 Part I of this Note outlines the current international and regional 
legal framework for the prosecution of pirates. It discusses the applicable 
international treaties and organizations that relate to maritime security 
and how these treaties and organizations affect states on a regional and 
domestic level. Part II identifies problems with the existing international 
legal framework, specifically, the lack of uniformity in the prosecution 
and punishment of pirates. Part III suggests that the variety of domestic 
laws creates a confusing patchwork of penalties and procedures that 
could be resolved with the creation of regional piracy tribunals. 
I. Background 
A. International Legal Framework Governing the Safety of  
Maritime Navigation 
 Piracy is an international crime that falls under every state’s juris-
diction under customary international law.7 Universal jurisdiction en-
dows every state with the right to prosecute and punish piracy regard-
less of where the attack occurs.8 Because of universal jurisdiction, each 
state has the responsibility to prosecute pirates under its own domestic 
laws irrespective of a pirate’s original nationality, the registry of the 
ship, or the destination of the cargo.9 
 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
codified the customary international law on piracy in Articles 100 to 
107.10 Given that UNCLOS is a codification of customary international 
law, it is binding on every state including non-parties to the conven-
tion.11 Articles 100 to 107 of UNCLOS govern the provisions relating to 
                                                                                                                      
6 International Efforts to Combat Maritime Piracy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Interna-
tional Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs H.R., 111th 
Cong. 6 (2009) (statement of Rep. William D. Delahunt, Chairman of Subcommittee). 
7 Bederman, supra note 5, at 76. 
8 Id.; Lawrence Azubuike, International Law Regime Against Piracy, 15 Ann. Surv. Int’l 
& Comp. L. 43, 44 (2009). 
9 Martin N. Murphy, Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money: The Challenge 
of Piracy 12 (2009); see Bederman, supra note 5, at 189. 
10 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 100–107, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]; Murphy, supra note 9, at 13–16. 
11 Azubuike, supra note 8, at 49. 
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the definition, jurisdiction, and obligations of member states seeking to 
pursue, capture, and prosecute maritime pirates.12 Under UNCLOS, 
there are four essential elements to the definition of piracy: 1) an ille-
gal act involving violence, detention, or depredation 2) committed for 
private ends 3) on the high seas 4) involving at least two ships.13 UN-
CLOS also reaffirms the idea of universal jurisdiction because it gives 
every state jurisdiction to seize and prosecute pirates according to that 
state’s domestic laws.14 
 By contrast, the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation (SUA) expands the types of activity that may be 
prosecuted while limiting the jurisdictional requirements necessary to 
prosecute.15 This treaty defines an offense as 1) intentionally seizing or 
damaging a ship or 2) attempting to seize or damage a ship.16 The SUA 
definition eliminates the motive requirements that UNCLOS contains 
in its “for private ends” element.17 The convention also expands the 
UNCLOS definition of piracy because it applies to any ship navigating 
to, through, or from the territorial seas.18 Under SUA, a state has juris-
diction over an offense only if it is committed against a ship flying that 
state’s flag, in that state’s territory, or committed against a national of 
that state.19 
 SUA also imposes an obligation on member states to extradite or 
prosecute the suspected offender.20 If the capturing state cannot estab-
lish jurisdiction, SUA requires that it extradite the offender to a state 
that has successfully established jurisdiction.21 Thus far, there are 134 
countries that have subscribed to SUA, but the mandatory extradite or 
prosecute requirement deters many Southeast Asian states from ratify-
ing it.22 
                                                                                                                      
12 UNCLOS, supra note 10, arts. 100–107. 
13 Id. art. 101; Rosemary Collins & Daud Hassan, Applications and Shortcomings of the 
Law of the Sea in Combating Piracy: A South East Asian Perspective, 40 J. Mar. L. & Com. 89, 94 
(2009). 
14 See UNCLOS, supra note 10, art. 105. 
15 Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation arts. 3, 6, 
Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter SUA]; Collins & Hassan, supra note 13, at 89, 
106–08. 
16 SUA, supra note 15, art. 3. 
17 Collins & Hassan, supra note 13, at 107. 
18 SUA, supra note 15, art. 4. 
19 Id. art. 6. 
20 Id. art. 10; Collins & Hassan, supra note 13, at 108. 
21 SUA, supra note 15, art. 10. 
22 Collins & Hassan, supra note 13, at 108; U.S. Dep’t of State, International Con-
ventions and Protocols on Terrorism, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/83238. 
htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2010). 
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 In addition to multilateral treaties, there are several international 
organizations such as the International Chamber of Commerce’s In-
ternational Maritime Bureau (IMB) and the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) that seek to ensure the safe navigation of ships.23 
The IMB is a non-profit organization whose stated goal is to fight mari-
time crime, such as piracy.24 The IMB established its Piracy Reporting 
Centre in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia to monitor and provide advice on 
the growing piracy problem worldwide.25 The Piracy Reporting Centre 
is funded through voluntary contributions.26 The Centre’s stated pur-
pose is to provide a centralized information center on pirate attacks 
and to educate and warn shippers and traders about high-risk areas.27 
The IMB also performs other functions such as investigation services 
and litigation support. 28 Additionally, it has the capability to track hi-
jacked and phantom ships.29 
 For statistical purposes, the IMB adopts a broad definition of pi-
racy that includes actual and attempted attacks both when the ship is at 
anchor or at sea.30 Thus, the IMB defines “piracy and armed robbery” 
as “an act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the appar-
ent intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the apparent 
intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of that act.”31 The 
IMB’s expansive definition affects the number of attacks that the IMB 
will track.32 Since this definition differs from the UNCLOS and SUA 
                                                                                                                      
23 See ICC Com. Crime Servs., Int’l Mar. Bureau, IMB Piracy Reporting Centre, http:// 
www.icc-ccs.org (follow “IMB Piracy Reporting Centre” hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 20, 2010) 
[hereinafter IMB Piracy Reporting Centre]; Int’l Maritime Org., Introduction to IMO, http:// 
www.imo.org/About/mainframe.asp?topic_id=3 (last visited Apr. 20, 2010) [hereinafter In-
troduction to IMO]. 
24 ICC Com. Crime Servs., Int’l Mar. Bureau, http://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php? 
option=com_content&view=article&id=27&Itemid=16 (last visited Apr. 20, 2010); see Int’l 
Chamber of Com.’s Int’l Mar. Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, 
Report for the Period 1 Jan. – 30 Jan. 2009 2 (2009) [hereinafter IMB Report]. 
25 IMB Piracy Reporting Centre, supra note 23. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 ICC Com. Crime Servs., Int’l Mar. Bureau, Investigation Services, http://www.icc-
ccs.org (follow “International Maritime Bureau” hyperlink; then follow “Services” hyper-
link) (last visited Apr. 20, 2010) [hereinafter IMB Investigation Services]; ICC Com. Crime 
Servs., Int’l Mar. Bureau, Case Work, http://www.icc-ccs.org (follow “International Ma-
ritime Bureau” hyperlink; then follow “Services” hyperlink; then follow “Case Work” hyper-
link) (last visited Apr. 20, 2010) [hereinafter IMB Case Work]. 
29 IMB Investigation Services, supra note 28; IMB Case Work, supra note 28. 
30 IMB Report, supra note 24, at 4. 
31 Id. 
32 Zou Keyuan, New Developments in the International Law of Piracy, 8 Chinese J. Int’l L. 
323, ¶¶ 10–11 (2009). 
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definitions of piracy, not every incident reported to IMB would be con-
sidered formal piracy under international law.33 
 In contrast to the IMB’s stated purpose, the IMO’s purpose is to 
develop a regulatory framework to maintain safe, secure, and efficient 
shipping over the high seas.34 To improve security on the high seas and 
at port facilities, the IMO develops initiatives to combat two types of 
threats: piracy, as defined in UNCLOS, and armed robbery at sea.35 Pi-
racy can only occur on the high seas, while armed robbery at sea can 
only occur in territorial waters that are within twelve miles of a nation’s 
coastline.36 
 Recognizing the importance of domestic laws in the successful 
prosecution of pirates, the IMO passed Resolution A. 1025 (26), which 
encourages states to ratify enabling legislation that would codify their 
universal jurisdiction over piracy and establish procedures to facilitate 
the prosecution of pirates.37 Resolution A. 1025 (26) also recommends 
guidelines for piracy investigation strategies.38 The resolution suggests 
that flag states of the victimized ship should take the lead in investiga-
tions for piracy incidents; conversely, the state in whose territorial wa-
ters the incident occurs should bear the responsibility to investigate 
armed robbery at sea.39 
 The IMO not only creates a technical framework to deal with pi-
racy and armed robbery at sea, but it also aims to foster regional agree-
ments to counter piracy.40 It holds regional seminars and workshops in 
piracy-infested areas to identify measures that may diminish pirate at-
tacks in that specific region.41 In the past decade, the IMO has held re-
                                                                                                                      
33 Azubuike, supra note 8, at 45. 
34 Introduction to IMO, supra note 23. 
35 Zou Keyuan, supra note 32, ¶ 8; Int’l Marititme Org., Piracy and Armed Robbery 
Against Ships, http://www.imo.org/Facilitation/mainframe.asp?topic_id=362#top (last vis-
ited Apr. 20, 2010) [hereinafter Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships]. 
36 Azabuike, supra note 8, at 50; Zou Keyuan, supra note 32, ¶ 8. 
37 Int’l. Maritime Org. [IMO], Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy 
and Armed Robbery Against Ships, IMO Assemb. Res. A. 1025 (26) (Dec. 2, 2009)). 
38 See generally id. (describing the suggested piracy investigation guidelines for member 
countries). 
39 Id. 
40 Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, supra note 35. 
41 Int’l Mar. Org., IMO Leads New Anti-Piracy Initiative, Mar. 13, 2001, http://www. 
imo.org/ (follow “Newsroom” hyperlink; then follow “IMO Press Briefings” hyperlink; then 
follow “Archive - 2001 Press Briefings” hyperlink) [hereinafter IMO Leads Anti-Piracy Initia-
tive]; Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, supra note 35. 
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gional seminars in Southeast Asia, Brazil, and with the states in the Gulf 
of Aden.42 
B. Regional Institutions and Domestic Developments in the Enforcement  
of International Laws 
 In recent years, there has been a trend towards more regional ap-
proaches to solve the piracy problem.43 In 2004, sixteen regional 
Southeast Asian states signed the Regional Cooperation Agreement on 
Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia (Re-
CAAP), which was the first multilateral agreement to address piracy in 
Southeast Asia.44 ReCAAP established an Information Sharing Centre 
in Singapore.45 In 2009, twenty-eight nations and six international or-
ganizations formed the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Soma-
lia to address piracy problems emanating from the Horn of Africa.46 
The common stated objectives for both regional groups include pro-
moting information exchange, supporting capacity-building efforts, 
and facilitating the regional operations of member states.47 
 Other regional organizations aimed at maintaining maritime secu-
rity include the Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa 
(MOWCA), which has its own sub-regional coast guard network.48 More 
recently, in an IMO-sponsored meeting for East African states, nine East 
African states signed the Djibouti Code, which creates a network of in-
formation centers to report pirate attacks.49 Although this agreement is 
                                                                                                                      
42 Int’l Mar. Org., Combatting Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships—Call for 
International Code, May 13, 1999, http://www.imo.org/ (follow “Newsroom” hyperlink; 
then follow “IMO Press Briefings” hyperlink; then follow “Archive - 1999 Press Briefings” 
hyperlink); IMO Leads Anti-Piracy Initiative, supra note 41; Piracy and Armed Robbery 
Against Ships, supra note 35. 
43 International Efforts to Combat Maritime Piracy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Interna-
tional Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs H.R., 111th 
Cong. 17 (2009) (testimony of William Baumgartner, Admiral, J. Advocate Gen., and Chief 
Counsel, U.S. Coast Guard) [hereinafter Baumgartner Testimony—Piracy Hearing]; Collins & 
Hassan, supra note 13, at 89. 
44 ReCAAP Info. Sharing Centre, About ReCAAP ISC, http://www.recaap.org/about/ 
about1_2.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2010) [hereinafter About ReCAAP ISC]. 
45 Id. 
46 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, The Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Soma-
lia (May 18, 2009), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/05/123584.htm. 
47 Id.; About ReCAAP ISC, supra note 44, at 3. 
48 James Kraska & Brian Wilson, Combating Pirates of the Gulf of Aden: The Djibouti Code 
and the Somali Coast Guard, 52 Ocean & Coastal Mgmt. 516, 519 (2009). 
49 Id. at 519, 520. 
2010] Piracy Laws & the Effective Prosecution of Pirates 279 
not legally binding, signatories agreed to arrest and prosecute pirates 
and to help repatriate hostages.50 
 Despite the codification of universal jurisdiction and the push for 
greater regional cooperation, customary international law still requires 
domestic legislation to prosecute the crime.51 Because states have dis-
cretion in their construction of domestic legislation on piracy, the in-
corporation of the full jurisdictional provisions from SUA and UN-
CLOS varies from state to state.52 For instance, China has no specific 
anti-piracy legislation but rather prosecutes piracy under its general 
Criminal Code.53 China’s general Criminal Code incorporates any 
crime that is defined in a Chinese-ratified international treaty.54 In con-
trast, Australia has incorporated all of UNCLOS’s piracy provisions into 
Part IV of its Crimes Act of 1914.55 Similarly, the United States has en-
acted the majority of the provisions from the SUA in 18 U.S.C. § 2280.56 
 UNCLOS and SUA themselves are silent regarding the prosecu-
tion of captured pirates, leaving such decisions to the discretion of each 
individual state’s legal systems.57 Consequently, it is difficult for some 
states to prosecute pirates because of procedural impediments that are 
not “forward-thinking.”58 Other states lack resources to spend on a full 
trial and possible imprisonment of the accused.59 
 Even in states that possess the necessary resources and procedures 
for pirate prosecution, political reasons may prevent a pirate’s prosecu-
tion.60 For example, the United Kingdom will not prosecute pirates of 
certain nationalities because its asylum laws might allow the offender to 
                                                                                                                      
50 Id. at 520. 
51 Baumgartner Testimony—Piracy Hearing, supra note 43, at 27; see Collins & Hassan, su-
pra note 13, at 102, 104; Niclas Dahlvang, Thieves, Robbers, & Terrorists: Piracy in the 21st 
Century, 4 Regent J. Int’l L. 17, 39 (2006). 
52 Murphy, supra note 9, at 12. 
53 Collins & Hassan, supra note 13, at 102. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Violence Against Maritime Navigation, 18 U.S.C. § 2280 (1996); Dahlvang, supra 
note 51, at 23. 
57 See SUA, supra note 15, art. 10; UNCLOS, supra note 10, art. 105. 
58 Baumgartner Testimony—Piracy Hearing, supra note 43, at 27. 
59 Kraska & Wilson, supra note 1, at 3. 
60 International Efforts to Combat Maritime Piracy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Interna-
tional Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs H.R., 111th 
Cong. 27 (2009) (testimony of Ambassador Stephen Mull, Senior Advisor, Under Secretary 
for Political Affairs, U.S. Department of State) [hereinafter Mull Testimony—Piracy Hear-
ing]. 
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remain in the country indefinitely after trial.61 In addition, the British 
Foreign Office in London issued a legal opinion stating that Somalian 
pirates who would be subject to harsh treatment in Somalia cannot be 
deported because such deportation would violate the British Human 
Rights Act.62 Similarly, the Portuguese will only arrest pirates when Por-
tuguese nationals or ships are involved.63 
 To resolve this enforcement problem, the United States and the 
United Kingdom signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Kenya 
in 2009 to send pirates captured by their navies to Kenyan courts for 
prosecution.64 Given the massive Kenyan caseload and Kenya’s inexpe-
rienced legal system, there are doubts as to whether this agreement will 
lead to more effective prosecutions of pirates.65 
 Even after offenders are successfully prosecuted, states differ in the 
type of punishments meted out.66 For example, China has no word for 
“piracy,” and thus it prosecutes pirates for armed robbery and murder 
instead.67 Its punishments range from as few as ten years in prison to 
death.68 Likewise, the Brazilian pirates who robbed and murdered a 
famous New Zealand yachtsman were sentenced to thirty-seven years 
for armed robbery and murder, instead of piracy.69 When adjudicating 
on the charge of piracy, Indian courts sentenced fourteen Indonesian 
pirates to seven years of hard labor,70 and Argentina may sentence a 
pirate to three to fifteen years in prison even if no one is killed during 
the attack.71 By contrast, Indonesian courts have been known to give 
pirates as little as two to four years in prison.72 
                                                                                                                      
61 Id. at 28; Peter Mwaurap, Op-Ed., Why Kenya Must Not Be Used to Dump Suspected Pi-
rates, Daily Nation (Nairobi), Apr. 17, 2009, http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/Opinion/-/ 
440808/561166/-/459d42/-/index.html. 
62 Paul Reynolds, Rules Frustrate Anti-Piracy Efforts, BBC News, Dec. 9, 2008, http:// 
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7735144.stm. 
63 Wrong Signals; Piracy. Pirates and Legal Knots, Economist, May 9, 2009, at 1. 
64 Baumgartner Testimony—Piracy Hearing, supra note 43, at 17. 
65 See Mwaurap, supra note 61. But see Kraska & Wilson, supra note 1, at 3. 
66 Mull Testimony—Piracy Hearing, supra note 60, at 32; see Dahlvang, supra note 51, at 
24–25. 
67 Zou Keyuan, supra note 32, ¶ 55. 
68 Id. 
69 Kathy Marks, Amazon Pirates Who Killed Yachting Hero Get 37 Years, Independent 
(London), June 21, 2002, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/amazon- 
pirates-who-killed-yachting-hero-get-37-years-645993.html. 
70 Dahlvang, supra note 51, at 25. 
71 Joshua Michael Goodwin, Universal Jurisdiction and the Pirate: Time for an Old Couple to 
Part, 39 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 973, 1005 (2006). 
72 Id. at 40. 
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 The variations of legal frameworks within the international com-
munity and among states creates a variety of definitions and penalties 
for piracy.73 This lack of uniformity in piracy laws interferes with the 
effective prosecution of pirates.74 
II. Discussion 
 The current international legal framework on piracy is flawed be-
cause it does not provide a universally applicable definition of piracy, 
and because it does not create uniform guidelines for the prosecution 
and punishment of pirates.75 There is a discrepancy between the of-
fense of piracy under international law and how the offense is actually 
prosecuted and punished under each state’s domestic laws.76 
 The UNCLOS definition of piracy has four elements: 1) an illegal 
act involving violence, detention, or depredation 2) committed for pri-
vate ends 3) on the high seas 4) involving at least two ships.77 Scholars 
criticize the first element because it categorically excludes all attempted 
hijackings or clandestine attacks, where attackers board at night and 
steal cargo without the knowledge of the crew.78 Thus, while this defini-
tion adequately describes Somali pirate attacks in which pirates are 
generally armed with AK-47s and rocket-propelled grenades,79 it does 
not adequately describe pirate attacks in Southeast Asia and Brazil that 
may include clandestine robberies of ships at anchor.80 
 Moreover, the “private ends” element in the UNCLOS definition is 
heavily criticized because it incorporates a motive requirement that ex-
cludes political terrorism and not-for-profit attacks.81 For example, an 
armed attack meant to bring international attention to a group’s strug-
gle for independence is not executed for “private ends” because it is 
not performed to profit the attackers.82 In similar fashion, hijacking 
                                                                                                                      
73 See generally Dahlvang, supra note 51; Zou Keyuan, supra note 32. 
74 Baumgartner Testimony—Piracy Hearing, supra note 43, at 27. 
75 Collins & Hassan, supra note 13, at 97–98, 108--09. 
76 Id. at 112. 
77 See UNCLOS, supra note 10, art. 101. 
78 Collins & Hassan, supra note 13, at 96–97. 
79 James Kraska & Brian Wilson, Piracy Repression, Partnering and the Law, 40 J. Mar. L. 
& Com. 43, 44 (2009). 
80 Collins & Hassan, supra note 13, at 97; ICC Com. Crime Servs., Int’l Mar. Bureau, 
IMB Piracy Incident Report 2009, http://www.icc-ccs.org (follow “View Live Piracy Map” 
hyperlink; then follow “Piracy Map 2009” hyperlink; then click on map pin over Brazil) (last 
visited Apr. 20, 2010) [hereinafter IMB Piracy Incident Report]. 
81 John Kavanagh, The Law of Contemporary Sea Piracy, 1999 Austl. Int’l L. J. 127, 137–38. 
82 Collins & Hassan, supra note 13, at 99. 
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done for a political motive is also not piracy under the UNCLOS defini-
tion.83 Accordingly, political motivation becomes a legitimate defense 
to piracy under this definition.84 
 Furthermore, the “two-ship” requirement excludes mutiny as an 
act of piracy because the internal seizure of a ship does not involve two 
separate ships.85 Scholars have often debated whether to add political 
terrorism and mutiny to the UNCLOS definition of piracy.86 Political 
terrorism and mutiny, however, have different root causes and different 
solutions than piracy does.87 Terrorists typically seek to draw attention 
to a cause regardless of whether the offenders profit from the attack, 
while pirates are solely motivated by profit and seek to avoid atten-
tion.88 For this reason, expanding the UNCLOS definition of piracy is 
not constructive in building an effective international legal framework 
for the prosecution and punishment of modern day piracy because pi-
racy and terrorism require different solutions.89 
 Finally, the “high seas” element of the UNCLOS definition of pi-
racy may apply best to Somali piracy, but it is a severe limitation on 
Southeast Asian piracy.90 In the Gulf of Aden, the coordinated naval 
presence of an international fleet has driven pirates to attack up to 700 
miles from the coastline, an area that is well past the twelve-mile territo-
rial seas.91 Conversely, most attacks in Southeast Asia occur in narrow 
straits that fall within a nation’s territorial seas.92 Therefore, in South-
east Asia, even if caught, the attackers cannot be prosecuted for “pi-
racy” because their acts would not fall within the UNCLOS definition of 
piracy.93 
 While the SUA attempts to fill the legal gaps within the UNCLOS 
provisions, it is in no way a complete solution to the piracy problem.94 
On the one hand, SUA creates a more comprehensive legal framework 
because it eliminates the private ends requirement, broadens the geo-
                                                                                                                      
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Dahlvang, supra note 51, at 28. 
86 See Kavanagh, supra note 81, at 128. 
87 See Collins & Hassan, supra note 13, at 100. 
88 Id. 
89 Id.; see Kraska & Wilson, supra note 79, at 45. 
90 Collins & Hassan, supra note 13, at 97–98; Somali Pirates Seize Chinese Ship, CBS News, 
Oct. 19, 2009, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/10/19/world/main5396746.shtml. 
91 See Somali Pirates Seize Chinese Ship, supra note 90 (noting that pirates boarded a Chi-
nese cargo ship 700 miles east of the Somali coastline). 
92 Collins & Hassan, supra note 13, at 97. 
93 See id. 
94 Id. at 107–08. 
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graphical limits of the crime, and imposes a strict prosecute or extra-
dite requirement on its members.95 On the other hand, SUA limits the 
idea of universal jurisdiction by restricting jurisdiction to states that 
have some connection to the offense.96 Moreover, SUA provisions are 
only binding on states that are parties to the convention.97 
 Additional confusion ensues among international and regional 
organizations when determining which definition of piracy to en-
force.98 The IMB ignores both the UNCLOS and SUA definitions, and 
instead defines piracy as boarding a vessel with the intent to commit a 
crime.99 By contrast, the IMO recognizes two international maritime 
crimes: piracy, as defined by UNCLOS, and armed robbery at sea.100  
The divide is further exacerbated at the regional cooperative level.101 
ReCAAP follows the IMO bipartite definition of piracy102 while the U.S.-
led naval forces off the coast of Somalia promote the SUA definition.103 
 If the diversity of definitions for piracy were not problematic 
enough, it is compounded by the fact that no international legal frame-
work exists that establishes clear guidelines for the prosecution and pun-
ishment of pirates.104 UNCLOS does not establish a practical framework 
to prosecute and punish pirates105 because it allows the individual seiz-
ing state to “decide upon the penalties.”106 UNCLOS only defines the 
circumstances under which universal jurisdiction applies but does not 
set a universal penalty or empower a single tribunal to hear the charge 
of piracy.107 Similarly, SUA does not mention trial procedures or estab-
lish penalties for its defined offenses.108 The lack of uniformity on an 
international level results in various punishments for piracy that range 
                                                                                                                      
95 Id.; Zou Keyuan, supra note 32, ¶ 21. 
96 SUA, supra note 15, art. 6 (listing situations in which a state party can establish its ju-
risdiction); see Collins & Hassan, supra note 13, at 108. 
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from three years to life in prison.109 Additionally, a pirate will likely have 
no familiarity with the domestic criminal procedures of the prosecuting 
state.110 
 This variety in prosecution and punishment can also lead to tense 
international relations when certain states are unwilling to expend 
their own resources to capture and prosecute pirates.111 UNCLOS 
leaves the prosecution of captured pirates to the discretion of each 
state, some of which are unwilling to prosecute pirates at all.112 Conse-
quently, the enforcement of international piracy laws is only as effective 
as the domestic legal institutions that are willing and able to prosecute 
the crime.113 Thus, powerful countries with developed legal systems, 
which incorporate the international definitions of piracy, are more like-
ly to punish pirates than less developed countries.114 This phenomenon 
has the unintended side-effect of imposing a Western view of retribu-
tion and punishment on pirates from developing countries.115 Fur-
thermore, the uncertainty as to whether a pirate will be successfully 
prosecuted may decrease a state’s willingness to cooperate in the pur-
suit and capture of pirates altogether.116 
 Universal jurisdiction is ineffective in successfully punishing piracy 
because it creates a patchwork of domestic legal frameworks for the 
prosecution and punishment of piracy which is inadequate to effec-
tively address the modern piracy concern.117 
III. Analysis 
 To address the issue of effective piracy prosecution, scholars have 
proposed three categories of solutions: 1) change the existing interna-
tional definition to a uniform definition of piracy followed by uniform 
domestic legislation; 2) supplement existing international treaties with 
multilateral and bilateral treaties; and 3) allow international courts to 
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enforce international piracy laws.118 Of these three solutions, the estab-
lishment of regional international courts is the only option that can be 
accomplished without infringing on the territorial sovereignty of states 
and without creating a superfluous number of treaties.119 
 Regional piracy tribunals could enforce an applicable regional de-
finition of piracy and create a uniform criminal procedure and pun-
ishment.120 They could apply a uniform definition of piracy applicable 
to each region.121 Therefore, instead of states applying their own defini-
tion of piracy, regional piracy tribunals would apply a common defini-
tion of piracy to each region.122 Regional piracy tribunals could provide 
“uniformity in treatment”123 that would remove the problems created 
by the variety of punishments and procedures that currently exist and 
could result in the more effective prosecution of piracy.124 
 Regional piracy tribunals can be created from the regional coop-
erative arrangements that currently exist and could mimic the treaty-
based foundation of the International Criminal Court.125 For example, 
ReCAAP in Southeast Asia could establish its own regional piracy tribu-
nal within one member state, MOWCA could sponsor its own regional 
tribunal for West Africa, while the signatory states of the Djibouti Code 
could create one for East Africa.126 Furthermore, each regional piracy 
tribunal could derive its jurisdiction from a modified territorial jurisdic-
tion principle, through which member states would establish a geo-
graphic scope that falls within the tribunal’s power.127 Such a geo-
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graphic scope could include both territorial seas and the high seas,128 
and it would clarify jurisdiction and eliminate the problems associated 
with establishing post hoc jurisdiction after a pirate attack occurs.129 
 Becase the regional piracy tribunals would be treaty-based, they 
would complement domestic criminal justice systems rather than re-
place them.130 The regional piracy tribunal would offer an alternative 
forum for both member states and non-member states that are unable 
or unwilling to prosecute pirates.131 Like the International Criminal 
Court, regional piracy tribunals would not infringe on a state’s national 
sovereignty or domestic legal system.132 
 In contrast, changing the existing international definition of pi-
racy would not be as effective in the prosecution of pirates because the 
type of pirate attacks in each region vary due to their diverse geogra-
phy.133 There is no single international definition of piracy that can 
successfully incorporate the many different regional variations in at-
tacks that exist.134 In addition, since international definitions of piracy 
still require domestic enabling legislation to prosecute piracy, creating 
a uniform definition will not ensure that individual states take the nec-
essary measures to pass legislation that applies the new definition.135 
 Moreover, regional piracy tribunals can prevent the disputes over 
jurisdiction that individual states must negotiate under the current le-
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gal regime.136 By creating a single court that has jurisdiction over all 
incidents of piracy, irrespective of the states and nationalities involved, 
pirates can be prosecuted faster without the political wrangling that 
usually follows a pirate attack.137 Regional piracy tribunals can also op-
erate despite the existence of states that are unable or unwilling to 
prosecute pirates in their own courts.138 These tribunals provide an al-
ternative forum for states that lack the resources to prosecute pirates 
themselves.139 
 On the contrary, the creation of more multilateral and bilateral 
treaties to supplement UNCLOS and SUA would not be as effective for 
the prosecution of pirates because most treaties only create binding 
obligations their member states.140 Thus, creating networks of mutual 
assistance through multilateral and bilateral treaties is only effective 
when every affected country is a party to that treaty.141 Although bilat-
eral and multilateral treaties may help solve jurisdictional and prosecu-
torial issues,142 they are only effective when the seizing state has a treaty 
with all states possessing any interest in the specific attack.143 For exam-
ple, if the seizing state does not have an extradition treaty with the par-
ticular states involved, the captured pirates may go unpunished.144 
 Given the current international trend towards regional coordina-
tion in the fight against piracy, there already exists a basic foundation 
for coordination on which to create regional piracy tribunals.145 Re-
gional coordination such as ReCAAP can set a uniform definition of 
piracy for all member states.146 Additionally, the IMB already has the 
capability to investigate international maritime crimes and to provide 
litigation support for countries seeking to prosecute international mari-
                                                                                                                      
136 See Dahlvang, supra note 51, at 23; Kavanagh, supra note 81, at 156 (discussing juris-
diction in territorial waters). 
137 See Kraska & Wilson, supra note 79, at 51 (discussing the difficulties of determining 
who will assume jurisdiction immediately after capturing a pirate). 
138 See Azubuike, supra note 8, at 55, 58; Kraska & Wilson, supra note 1, at 3. 
139 See Azubuike, supra note 8, at 55, 58. 
140 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 627 (7th ed. 2008). 
141 See Collins & Hassan, supra note 13, at 108 (discussing an example in which offend-
ers go unpunished because no extradition treaty exists); Dahlvang, supra note 51, at 23 
(discussing the problem with jurisdiction when extradition treaties exist). 
142 See Kavanagh, supra note 81, at 157; Kraska & Wilson, supra note 79, at 53. 
143 See Collins & Hassan, supra note 13, at 108. 
144 Id. 
145 See Baumgartner Testimony—Piracy Hearing, supra note 43, at 17; Kraska & Wilson, supra 
note 1, at 1. See generally Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in 
Waters Off the Coast of Somalia, IMO Assemb. Res. A. 1026(26) (Dec. 2, 2009)) (suggesting 
investigation strategies to promote coordination between states). 
146 See Zou Keyuan, supra note 32, ¶ 9. 
288 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 33:273 
time offenders.147 Thus, international organizations such as the United 
Nations or the IMO could easily combine the existing regional net-
works of cooperation with the IMB’s investigative capabilities as a foun-
dation for the creation of regional piracy tribunals.148 
Conclusion 
Piracy is an international crime that is subject to universal jurisdic-
tion, which gives every state the right to prosecute and punish pirates. 
Because of differences in geography and types of attacks, the interna-
tional definitions of piracy as defined in UNCLOS and SUA are both 
under and over-inclusive. In addition, because each state has discretion 
regarding whether and how they choose to prosecute and punish pi-
rates, there is no firm international legal framework by which to prose-
cute pirates. The best solution to this patchwork of criminal prosecu-
tions is to place universal jurisdiction in the hands of regional piracy 
tribunals. Each tribunal could enforce a definition of piracy that is 
more applicable to each specific region, provide uniform procedures 
and penalties, and offer an alternative forum for prosecution to states 
that lack the resources to prosecute themselves. 
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